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DCI/IC/0858-74

7 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee, USIB

SUBJECT : Proposed Interim Organization of TSC and
R&D Functions

1. Following some discussions at the 13 September 1974 meeting of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSC), you asked for recommendations as to ways in which the TSC and its Research and Development function might be structured to better serve the Security Committee. We based our assessment of the problem on an analysis of the basic functions of the Security Committee as defined in DCID 1/11 and on discussions with the leadership of the USIB JAEIC, GMAIC, and SIGINT Committees concerning analogous patterns of community activities. We recommend that the purview of the TSC and the Research and Development Working Group be expanded to include most of the areas of technical security assigned to the Security Committee. We also recommend that you attain four to six months experience along these lines prior to making any formal amendments to DCID 1/11.

2. A review of DCID 1/11 shows that the Security Committee is charged with formulating standards and practices for personnel, physical, and document security (paragraph 2b) in addition to technical surveillance defense (paragraph 2e). Because experience has shown that Technical Surveillance Security depends heavily upon physical security, it is recommended that the TSC include physical security as well as other technical aspects of security within its area of concern. In this way the intelligence community will have a comprehensive basis of experience and technology in the area of technical security filling a heretofore recognized but unfilled void.

3. In reviewing the six generic areas of responsibility of the Security Committee as spelled out in DCID 1/11, that is, Computer Security, Compartmentation, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures, and Physical, Personnel and Documents Security,

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it is anticipated that Research and Development support will be needed in each of these areas to greater or lesser degrees. In the past, however, only Technical Surveillance Countermeasures has had a directly accessible R&D body. It is recommended, therefore, that the TSC Research and Development operation previously a subcommittee under the TSCC, now a working group, be asked to respond to R&D requirements levied by the TSC or by the other subcommittees or by the Security Committee itself in much the same way as a separate subcommittee for R&D might be tasked. There are several reasons for this recommendation.

- a. A single coordinated security R&D effort will be facilitated. This should assist the Security Committee in its efforts to respond to its assigned responsibilities for providing a Government-wide security policy.
- b. Having a single R&D Subcommittee will obviate the need for individual subcommittee R&D working groups and is, therefore, expected to be a more efficient effort by eliminating the potential for duplicative efforts.
- c. The scope of a single R&D Subcommittee would not be undesirably restricted as might be the scope of individual subcommittee R&D working groups.
- d. Will emphasize the interrelationship and interdependence of the various aspects of security.

4. We respectfully submit these recommendations to you for consideration by the TSC, and with their approval to the Security Committee. We are prepared to discuss our comments further as you might desire.



Director
Office of Research and Development

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